IT is that time of the year again when Zanu PF heads to its annual people’s conference. One resolution from last year’s edition in Bulawayo threw the cat amongst the successionist pigeons.
The conference resolved that the term of office for Emmerson Mnangagwa as President of the Republic of Zimbabwe and First Secretary of Zanu PF be extended beyond 2028 to 2030.
A lot of political manoeuvres have happened since. Those in support of the move have been singing slogans to the effect that Mnangagwa will still be ruling in 2030.
Of late, the slogans have extended the period to 2035. The writing has always been on the wall and some of us already indicated that the push for 2030 is not about 2030.
It does not make political or business sense to expend so much financial, social and political capital just to extend one’s rule by two years.
While the annual conference is not a congress and does not decide succession issues, it offers key moves on the succession chess board whose checkmate will be at the 2027 congress.
One of those moves would be to drop more resolutions that advance the agenda of the third termists. I will follow this strand in a different instalment.
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Today, I want to explore the pathways to resolving the succession impasse. There are so far only two mechanisms through which Zanu PF has managed succession since its formation 62 years ago of which for now, one is unlikely and the other untenable.
Succession in Zanu PF has historically been managed through a military-arbitrated transition and through delayed succession. These two are currently fraught with problems.
I share the conviction that the succession race cannot be settled through the familiar Zanu PF precedents this time around. The old script is now a broken storyline.
Can a third mechanism emerge or is the party trapped in the vicious cycle of postponement leading to military resolution?
2017 template unlikely
Zanu PF, in its 62-year history of three presidents has always changed leadership through a military-arbitrated transition where the military has played the role of the selectorate for Zanu PF presidency.
From the 1975 Mgagao Declaration, which deposed the late Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole to the 2017 coup with ousted late former president Robert Mugabe, this is all the transition that has happened at that level. This has been the playbook which political pundits are quick to point out as the likely scenario even now: if leadership struggles escalate, expect the military and security actors to arbitrate.
However plausible and dramatic as this prognosis may be, I find it too simplistic. It ignores the political complexities, factors and indicators that make such a development likely in this case.
Particularly in 2017, various factors converged to create a fertile ground for the military to meddle in succession politics. The exigencies resulting in the 2017 coup were created by a perfect storm, which rode on Mugabe’s advanced age and failing health, Grace Mugabe’s polarising role, Mnangagwa’s survival instincts, and the military’s threatened interests and its willingness to act.
Conditions may not be replicated
Currently, nothing suggests that the incumbent’s age or health is failing him, while local businessman Kuda Tagwirei and the so-called “zvigananda” may be polarising to some extent, they are not within the internal locus of leadership and hence not a big factor that can cause ructions in the party.
They can be reined in if need be. Further, Vice-President Constantino Chiwenga’s political survival instincts have not been tested and honestly, he is politically still very green compared to his principal.
On the other hand, there is nothing to suggest that the military’s interests are threatened nor is there an immediate existential threat to its generals the proportion of what we saw in 2017 when there was even a foiled attempt to arrest Chiwenga when he was commander of the Defence Forces.
Military doesn’t act on sentiment
The military do not act for symbolic reasons simply because “one of their own” has been deposed. If that was the case, they would have acted when General Solomon Mujuru died in a mysterious fire and would also have acted decisively when most coup generals started falling by the wayside one after the other under very suspicious circumstances soon after the coup.
So, to suggest that it would step in to save Chiwenga simply because he is one of theirs borders on the naïve. Elites also learn from history.
Mnangagwa constantly adjusts the command matrix in the military and the patronage structures precisely to prevent a repeat of 2017. So, if you ask me, this option is far-fetched.
Whenever succession threatens the military’s material or ideological interests, that is when it asserts veto power.
Delayed succession model untenable
The second mechanism in which succession has been managed in Zanu PF has been through incumbent extending their stay in power effectively deferring the succession issue.
That is kicking the succession can down the road. This is what the Mnangagwa faction is pushing for. They are begging the President to refuse to step down and extend his rule beyond 2028.
This can only be achieved through a combination of constitutional amendments or political manipulation and patronage.
Mugabe survived through this tactic for a long time by never naming a successor, continually shuffling political elites, purging ambitious ones and playing factions against each other to prevent any single rival from consolidating.
This time, this is unlikely to work for the Lacoste faction. To delay succession in the party, they would have to first secure Mnangagwa’s term in government.
The Zimbabwean constitutional guardrails make it very difficult to amend term provisions and still benefit the incumbent. The process is also fraught with legal, legislative and political hurdles designed for that exact purpose of discouraging term extensions.
One would bleed too much financial and political capital to achieve that. So, this path of postponing or deferring succession is untenable and will soon be abandoned.
Term extension by proxy?
Seeing the insurmountable hurdles ahead, indications are that the President is also exploring nominating his own successor to rival Vice-President Chiwenga.
Analysts and opponents of that move have identified Tagwirei as that proxy, which explains why attempts to co-opt him into the Central Committee have been heavily politicised and blocked for now. Whether this eventually succeeds or not is a matter of time.
Seeing that the military-arbitrated succession seems implausible and the delayed succession seems improbable, the question still lingers: can Zanu PF evolve a third method of institutionalised party-led succession?
Third succession pathway sensible
If Mnangagwa is the reformer that his supporters would have us believe he is, then the current succession discourse creates possibilities for a new pathway of institutionalised succession management.
If not for posterity, then it is for want of any other alternative mechanism.
Of course, such a process would still be dominated by the President through his wide-ranging prerogative to appoint deputies and the politiburo and his proxy may still emerge as the successor through this process.
This means it does not guarantee that Chiwenga takes over but leaves that possibility open still.
This pathway of a party-managed, elite-negotiated transition in which power is transferred without open conflict or military coercion will break the vicious cycle of delayed succession and military intervention in Zanu PF. It relies on internal bargaining among top Zanu PF elites, rather than coups or indefinite delays.
Path to success for contenders
Which ever way the pendulum swings on these succession mechanisms, the contenders still remain Mnangagwa (even through proxy) and Chiwenga and the path to either one’s success depends on distinct strategies and constraints.
For Mnangagwa, the incumbent, success is largely determined by his ability to maintain loyalty across the military, party structures and patronage networks.
By keeping these levers aligned, he can ensure that succession is managed according to his terms, whether through extension of his tenure or through the elevation of a loyal proxy.
Control over state resources, economic rents and strategic appointments enable him to secure elite compliance. We have seen these at play through his vast patronage network of the so-called “zvigananda” who are lavishly gifting party elites, public figures, pastors, celebrities etc with state of the range vehicles and obscene amounts of cash.
He will also depend on the careful use of both formal and informal institutional mechanisms, including party rules, constitutional amendments and personal networks to strengthen his position.
Mnangagwa wields the axe
Weakening potential rivals, particularly Chiwenga, through the systematic purging of his allies, further solidifies Mnangagwa’s dominance and reduces the likelihood of effective factional challenges.
We have seen the purging of Chiwenga’s allies in the military such as General Anselem Sanyatwe, who was moved from commander of the Zimbabwe National Army to a mere minister of Sport, Recreation, Arts and Culture!
Just recently, the Secretary-General of Zanu PF, Obert Mpofu was also purged and given a fringe position of Secretary for Information and Communication Technology as he is a perceived Chiwenga ally.
This has effectively consolidated Mnangagwa’s grip in the top six of the party hierarchy, leaving Chiwenga isolated and immobilised.
Chiwenga’s path asymmetrical
By contrast, Chiwenga’s path to the presidency is far more contingent on manufacturing dissent and opportunities of crisis. We have seen him attempt to manufacture dissent and resonance with ordinary members of the party and general citizens by presenting himself as an anti-corruption crusader and charging that Mnangagwa’s allies should be arrested.
As deputy, he is appointed by the President, but that appointment is not anointment to inherit power automatically.
Instead, his success depends on building broad support among elite factions while maintaining strong military networks capable of influencing succession decisions.
Chiwenga will have to leverage crisis moments to forge alliances with sidelined elites, G40 elements, war veterans and loyalists within the security sector, positioning himself as an alternative.
However, his ability to consolidate a faction is constrained by the fact that he cannot reliably protect his allies from purges, undermining his credibility as a leader and limiting his influence within both the party and the military.
Sober view
When all is said and done, analysis of the game of thrones in Zanu PF betrays an unpalatable reality. In Zimbabwean succession politics, the masses rarely shape where power lies; instead, they are at the mercy of whichever way the power pendulum swings, which is why my analysis did not include them as a real factor in succession politics.
Currently, the balance of probabilities is tipped towards the incumbent who sets the terms of engagement through incumbency, patronage and elite management.
Mnangagwa’s strategic consolidation of party and military levers makes his deputy’s path increasingly difficult, restricting it to conditional opportunities that depend on extraordinary circumstances or elite-negotiated succession. He would likely benefit from a third pathway to succession.
This is my sober view; I take no prisoners.
Dumani is an independent political analyst. He writes in his personal capacity.
