African leaders and regional and continental organisations generally abstained from publicly calling Operation Restore Legacy (ORL), which removed the late former president Robert Mugabe from power, a coup.
This avoidance of the term coup exhibited some of the mendacity of international relations in Africa and anti-coup mechanisms’ lack of traction with some African leaders.
In November 2017, Ivory Coast’s president Alassane Ouattara avoided describing ORL as a coup, he commended Mugabe for being an icon in the struggle for African independence, but concluded that the “world has changed” and because of the “long time he [Mugabe] has spent in office everyone is aware that it is time for him to hand over his seat to a new generation”.
Three years after Ouattara publicly endorsed Mugabe’s ouster in a coup on the grounds that Mugabe had overstayed in political power, Ouattara ran for a third term of office as Ivorian president, despite Ivory Coast’s constitution limiting presidents to two terms in office.
Ouattara’s undemocratic pursuit of long incumbency sparked political violence in Ivory Coast, in which at least 30 lives were lost in the build-up to the 2020 presidential election and no less than 55 people killed in post-election violence.
Ouattara, an octogenarian and one of the oldest incumbent African presidents, was re-elected for a controversial third term with an implausible 94% of the vote in an election boycotted by his two main opposition rivals.
Elsewhere in Africa, Nigerian president (2015 to 2023) Muhammadu Buhari, a former coup maker and military ruler from 1983 to 1985, appealed for “respect for the constitution”, but stopped short of publicly referring to ORL as a coup.
The outlier among statements by African leaders, which ranged from cautiously diplomatic to duplicitous, came from Alpha Condé, the African Union (AU) Chairperson.
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Condé was not more democratic than Buhari or Ouattara, but on November 15, 2017, he publicly stated that ORL “seems like a coup ... clearly soldiers [are] trying to take power by force. The African Union expresses its serious concern regarding the situation unfolding in Zimbabwe…. constitutional order should be restored immediately”.
On November 16, Condé’s public response to ORL was unequivocal: “we consider it a coup. President Mugabe is under house arrest, so he is not free. The internal situation in Zimbabwe is a little complicated by the action of some who want to eliminate people who fought for independence and contributed to making this country a model. There is a complex situation, but this can in no way justify a coup. This is why the African Union made a statement to say clearly that we demand a return to constitutional order and that we will never accept a coup d’état. Political problems must be solved within Zanu PF and not through military intervention”.
As AU chairperson, Condé was to some extent simply upholding the AU’s anti-coup norm when he took this critical public position against ORL.
The AU chairperson acts as the representative of the Assembly of Heads of State between summits of the continental body, hence Condé’s public stance against ORL may also have been based on consultations with some African leaders.
As we shall see, Condé and the AU’s First vice-chairperson, the Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni, were united in their opposition to ORL.
However, it goes without saying that Guinea, the country Condé governed, is characterised by unstable civil-military relations. At the time of ORL, Guinea had undergone two successful coups historically.
In 2011, Condé survived an assassination attempt organised by a section of Guinea’s military. Condé eventually lost power in a military coup in 2021.
Thus, Condé’s opposition to Zimbabwe’s 2017 coup might also have been spurred by his desire to promote the maintenance of the political status quo in Africa, amid ongoing coup risk in Guinea.
Furthermore, Condé had some ideational affinity with Mugabe, resulting in his opposition to Mugabe’s removal from power. Like Mugabe, Condé’s speeches often espoused pan-Africanist ideals and he was increasingly disposed to railing against Western interference in Africa.
When asked by the French newspaper Le Monde if Mugabe’s 2017 fall from power was a woeful end to a once illustrious political career, Condé retorted: “It is the Westerners who make judgments about our heads of state. We believe they are elected by a people and as long as the people support them, they should stay.
“We no longer accept being told who should stay, who should leave ... I trust the people, particularly the African people, the Zimbabwean people who led one of the most exemplary armed [liberation] struggles.
“Do not forget that London did not respect its commitments [to support the redistribution of land from whites to blacks in independent Zimbabwe]. The Lancaster Agreement [independence deal signed in 1979] established that the United Kingdom would compensate white landowners after land reform, which was not done. This, we forget to say.”
Mugabe would unreservedly agree with Condé’s emphasis on the principle of African sovereignty and his pinpointing of Britain’s reneging on an alleged financial promise to support the redress of racially biased land distribution in independent Zimbabwe.
The government of Ugandan president Museveni publicly fortified Condé’s attempt to uphold the AU’s anti-coup norm.
Museveni’s government averred that Mugabe’s “government is the legitimate leadership” and warned that it would not accept violation of the constitution by the Zimbabwean military.
Behind the scenes, Museveni personally contacted Zuma to express his opposition to ORL. Zuma described part of his communication with the Ugandan president: “Museveni phoned me. He said what is happening to Mugabe? I said we are handling it as Sadc and he said okay, but keep briefing me on what is happening. Museveni was very concerned. He said he did not want a coup in Africa.”
While Condé and Museveni, as AU chairperson and AU First vice-chairperson respectively, both vented their disapproval of ORL, with Condé openly employing the term coup, on November 16, 2017, Moussa Faki Mahamat, the chairperson of the AU Commission, publicly conveyed a conflicting evaluation of ORL.
As said by Mahamat: “the unfolding unrest in Zimbabwe was not a coup. The military have reassured us that this is not a coup d’état ...
“Mugabe and his family are safe in the country, a key factor in making that determination ... Anybody coming into power by force is, of course, condemned by the African Union, so we cannot accept any overthrow.”
“We all hope there will be no bloodshed and everything will be resolved peacefully’. Mahamat, who said that he left for Washington [on a pre-planned three-day working visit] as the situation in Zimbabwe developed, said he has not yet spoken to Mugabe,” Mahamat said.
Coups can range from violent to non-violent, hence that Mugabe was “safe” is inconsequential when determining if a military action constitutes a coup.
The principal target of a coup is the head of state and government. For this reason, it is peculiar that Mahamat publicly declared ORL was not a coup, so soon after the operation launched and without first engaging Mugabe, the coup’s primary target.
The late Major-General Sibusiso Moyo’s coup declaration on November 15, 2017, emphasised that: “Mugabe and his family are safe and sound.”
Mahamat’s echoing of Major-General Moyo’s statement that “Mugabe and his family are safe” suggests Zimbabwean military generals’ rhetoric partly influenced some AU officials’ initial understanding of ORL.
Mahamat remarked that he was “reassured” by Zimbabwean military generals “that this is not a coup d’état”.
This reassurance came from a couple of sources. First, as the president of a Sadc state pointed out, “my view at the time was that it was a coup, but Zimbabwe’s intelligence services did a good job of briefing African leaders that this was not a coup and they would not harm president Mugabe. Intelligence was constantly being passed to the region and continent”.
The generals appear to have also coaxed some African diplomats in Harare.
For example, one ambassador highlighted that the DRC ambassador to Zimbabwe Mawampanga Mwana Nanga, in his capacity as the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, actively suppressed critical discussion of ORL when diplomats convened during the coup: “The Foreign Ministry [through Joey Bimha, Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs and International Trade] invited all the ambassadors [for a meeting] to tell them what was going on [during the coup].
“We go to the ministry. A general spoke. He said they [military] were going to make things better. They would hold an election and this was going to be a great moment for Zimbabwe. Diplomats wanted to ask the general all kinds questions. I wanted to ask questions, but then the Congolese ambassador [Mwana Nanga], who was Dean of the Diplomatic Corps got up and said ‘no questions allowed’, so nothing we could do about that’.”
Secondly, the generals made use of a strategic intelligence conduit at the AU headquarters — Major-General Trust Mugoba. Eight months before the November 2017 coup, Mugoba, the Zimbabwean military’s Chief of Staff, was appointed Chief of Staff of the African Standby Force (ASF) within the AU Commission and as Chief Military Advisor to the AU’s Commissioner for Peace and Security.
In both capacities, Mugoba helped shape Mahamat’s contentious conception of ORL as not a coup.
- Tendi’s latest book, The Overthrow of Robert Mugabe: Gender, Coups and Diplomats, is available in Zimbabwe via Innov8 Bookshop.
