When I started secondary school, chemistry lessons revolved around the first 20 elements of the periodic table such as hydrogen, oxygen, sodium, calcium. They were presented as the building blocks of life and industry. We rarely ventured beyond them into the deeper sections of the table, where elements such as neodymium, dysprosium and cobalt quietly resided. Today, those once overlooked elements sit at the centre of global geopolitics. They shape foreign policy, industrial strategy, trade policy and the evolving balance of power between nations. This is the political economy of critical minerals.
Critical minerals are defined less by geological rarity than by economic importance and supply vulnerability. They are essential inputs into electric vehicles, renewable energy systems, advanced electronics, defence technologies and artificial intelligence infrastructure. Lithium is central to rechargeable battery technologies.
Rare earth elements are used in high-performance magnets found in wind turbines and certain defence systems. Platinum group metals, of which Zimbabwe holds significant reserves, are widely used in catalytic converters and are increasingly discussed in relation to hydrogen technologies.
The global energy transition and the expansion of digital technologies have elevated these minerals into strategic assets. They are no longer treated as ordinary commodities. They are increasingly embedded in national security calculations and industrial policy frameworks.
Control over value chains has become central. The strategic advantage lies beyond extraction but in processing, refining and manufacturing.
According to widely-published data from international energy and minerals agencies, China dominates global processing capacity for rare earth elements and plays a leading role in lithium refining and battery component manufacturing. This position has given it considerable influence within clean energy supply chains.
In response, the United States and the European Union have introduced policies aimed at securing supply chains, promoting domestic production and reducing dependency on single-country processing hubs. Legislation such as the US Inflation Reduction Act and the EU Critical Raw Materials Act reflects the re-emergence of industrial policy in advanced economies.
Trade and foreign policy are increasingly aligned with mineral security objectives. The days of pure aid are over, we will begin to see all manner of aid or financial support being linked to access to critical minerals. It therefore becomes imperative that every financial deal negotiated be subjected to microscopic scrutiny lest the country is mortgaged for life.
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Zimbabwe is directly impacted in this global shift. The country has significant lithium resources and is one of the world’s major producers of platinum group metals. These minerals are directly linked to the global energy transition and automotive sectors.
In 2022, Zimbabwe banned the export of unprocessed lithium ore. More recently, the government announced a suspension of exports of lithium concentrates and other raw minerals in an effort to promote domestic beneficiation. The stated objective is to ensure greater in-country value addition rather than exporting unprocessed resources. The policy has generated debate within mining, logistics and financial sectors. Questions around consultation, sequencing and implementation have been raised. Those operational considerations are important.
However, the underlying policy logic is clear. Zimbabwe seeks to reposition itself from a supplier of raw materials to a participant in higher value segments of the mineral value chain.
The challenge is that export restrictions alone do not create industrial capacity. Beneficiation requires processing infrastructure, reliable electricity supply, access to capital, technical expertise and regulatory predictability. Without these complementary systems, restrictions risk creating bottlenecks rather than transformation. Mining policy must therefore balance developmental ambition with policy stability. Investors require regulatory certainty.
At the same time, the state has a legitimate interest in ensuring that mineral resources contribute meaningfully to national development.
Industrial policy must move beyond rhetoric. Domestic refining capacity, technical skills development and infrastructure alignment are prerequisites for meaningful value addition. Trade policy must be structured to attract partnerships that include technology transfer and local processing commitments.
Clearly, there are also foreign policy implications. Many advanced economies are actively seeking secure access to critical minerals. Zimbabwe’s resource base provides leverage, but leverage must be strategically managed to secure long-term industrial participation rather than short-term extraction agreements.
The education system is equally central to this discussion. The historical emphasis on foundational elements in school science reflects a broader legacy. Zimbabwe’s education system was designed during an era when the economy was structured around agriculture, primary production and administrative services. The current global environment is shaped by materials science, battery chemistry, metallurgical engineering and advanced manufacturing.
The Fourth Industrial Revolution is often described in digital terms, but it is equally dependent on advanced materials derived from critical minerals. Artificial intelligence hardware, renewable energy systems and electric mobility platforms all rely on complex mineral inputs. Without domestic expertise in chemistry, engineering and geoscience, mineral endowment cannot translate into technological capability.
Zimbabwe’s Education 5.0 framework places emphasis on teaching, research, innovation and industrialisation. Its success will depend on whether it genuinely cultivates analytical thinking, scientific inquiry and applied research aligned with national economic priorities. Industrial transformation requires intellectual depth. Universities, technical colleges and research institutions must align skills development with mineral beneficiation ambitions.
Ultimately, the political economy of critical minerals is much broader than geology. It is about institutions, systems and policy coherence.
The decision to restrict exports of raw and semi-processed minerals signals a desire to capture greater value domestically. Whether that ambition translates into sustainable industrial capacity will depend on coordinated reform across mining regulation, infrastructure development, trade strategy and education policy.
The elements that once appeared peripheral in the classroom now sit at the centre of global industrial competition. They influence supply chains, diplomatic engagement and national development strategies.The strategic question for Zimbabwe is therefore not a complex one. Will the country remain primarily an exporter of raw materials, or will it build the institutional and industrial architecture necessary to move up the value chain?
- Mambure is a business leader and public policy scholar. He is a chartered marketer and fellow of the CIM (UK)and holds an MBA, Master in Public Policy and Government and an MSc in Marketing. — [email protected]
